The excess burden of taxes can be reduced by shifting taxes from labor and capital onto land, and by replacing progressive taxes with proportional taxes. This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to develop estimates of the magnitudes of reduction in excess burden that can be achieved in the U.S.
There are two categories of taxes that generate no excess burden. The first category consists of taxes that internalize externalities such as air pollution. Although such taxes induce taxpayers to substitute untaxed activities for taxed ones, they improve efficiency because they provide incentives to reduce activities that are harmful. The second category of taxes that have no excess burden is "non-contingent" taxes. A tax is non-contingent if its amount is independent of any action that the taxpayer might take. This independence implies that such taxes do not induce taxpayers to substitute untaxed activities for taxed ones. Non-contingent taxes (sometimes called "lump-sum" taxes) are described as "neutral" because they do not produce economic distortions.
The land component of a property tax is neutral as long as 1) the tax is administered in a way that makes the tax bill independent of how the land is used, and 2) taxpayers are confident that future taxes will not be so high as to make it unprofitable to hold title to land.
Because a tax on land can help to offset market imperfections, it can be better than neutral (Tideman, 1999) . One way that a land tax can improve efficiency is by discouraging inefficient land speculation. If everyone had perfect foresight, it would be impossible for anyone to make a profit from speculating in land. When foresight varies among people, those who believe they have superior foresight may conclude that there are opportunities for positive expected profits from speculating in land, and because futures markets in land do not exist, a person must hold land to speculate in it.
It is imaginable that land speculation would contribute to economic efficiency by preventing premature land development. However, there are two reasons for believing that speculation in land reduces economic efficiency. First, the necessity of holding land to speculate in it means that the most profitable speculation is one that combines holding land with the management of its current use. But this requires dual expertise. Opportunities for land speculation induce people to hold land even when they are not the ones who can manage land most profitably in its current best use.
Second, land speculation provides opportunities for the winner's curse to operate. This is the phenomenon that the highest bid for an object of uncertain value will come from the person who has made the greatest overestimate of its value (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) . The one-and twostory buildings that are pervasive in the downtown areas of large U.S. cities represent an underuse of valuable land that can best be explained as a result of land being held by persons who believe that they are likely to make a speculative killing if they continue to hold it for a few more years. If they give up and sell, the new buyers tend to be speculators as well.
An increase in the tax on land value lowers the selling price of land, thereby replacing the implicit cost of foregoing a current return on land with the explicit (and psychologically more urgent) cost of a tax bill. The reduced selling price of land also reduces the potential gain from land speculation. For this reason, a tax on land tends to reduce land speculation and thereby reduce the inefficiencies caused by the winner's curse and by having those who wish to speculate in land manage its current use. An early version of this argument can be found in Brown (1927) .
Taxing land also mitigates imperfections in lending markets. Because lending markets are imperfect, some people have higher discount rates than others. The present value of an increase in future taxes on land is greater for a person with a low discount rate than for a person with a high discount rate. Therefore a tax on land reduces the bid prices for land of those with low discount rates by more than it reduces the bid prices of those with high discount rates. Because those with high discount rates get greater returns from their assets, the resulting movement of land into their hands improves efficiency (Gaffney, 1961 (Gaffney, , 1973 . This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the efficiency gains that can be achieved in the United States by substituting a marginal increase in the tax on land for other taxes. The model is also used to estimate the efficiency gains from substituting a flat income tax for the current progressive income tax, as well as the gains from substituting taxes on land for as many current taxes as possible.
Our model has some characteristics in common with earlier models that were developed by Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) , Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) , Jorgenson and Yun (1991) and Nechyba (2001) . Like the first three papers, we study the economic effects of taxes through a dynamic general equilibrium model of intertemporal maximization by producers and consumers, in which taxes affect the prices that economic actors take into account when maximizing profits and utility. (Nechyba employs a comparative static model.) Like all of the above except Ballard et al., we assume that there is a single representative agent, and that production consists of a single private good and a single public good. (Ballard et al. have 12 types of agents and 19 private goods.) Like Ballard et al. and Jorgenson and Yun, we assume that the representative agent maximizes utility over an infinite horizon. (Auerbach et al. assumed that their agents had overlapping life spans of 55 years; time does not enter explicitly into Nechyba's analysis). Like Nechyba, we distinguish land and capital as separate factors of production. The other three papers incorporate both land and capital into what the authors call capital. Like the models in the first three papers above, our model takes no account of space or regional variations; implicitly, all production is assumed to occur in the same place. Nechyba has a separate model for each state in the U.S., which is treated as an open economy. We and the other authors use closed models.
II. The Model
Our model employs a production function with three factors of production: land (T), labor (L) and capital (K). The production function is a symmetric CES function,
where τ is the year and c (τ -2000) represents the impact of technological advance. The parameter α is related to the elasticity of substitution in production, σ 1 , by the equation α = 1 -1/σ 1 .
We assume that there is one infinitely lived household, with a growth rate that follows a linear approximation of population growth under the middle Census projection for U.S.
population. A constant proportion of the members of this household work. The quantity of labor that is employed in any year is the quantity that the household chooses to supply in maximizing its intertemporal utility function. The quantity of capital that is employed in any year is the amount that the household has accumulated in maximizing its intertemporal utility function. The quantity of land that is employed in any year reflects the response of land speculation to taxes on land. The percentage of available land that is used is given by
where n is the percentage of land rent that is collected by the property tax and φ is chosen to yield an estimate of current land efficiency under current taxes.
The household receives utility in a given period from three goods: private goods per worker (V), public goods per worker (B) and leisure per worker (Z). The within-period utility function is a symmetric CES function,
and the household's intertemporal utility function is also CES:
To select a value for σ 1 , we draw on literature that has sought to estimate the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. The work of Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961) on the CES production function generated many publications in the 1960's and 1970's that attempted to estimate the elasticity of substitution in production. Early time series work (Kendrick and Sato, 1963; Bodkin and Klein, 1967; Berndt, 1976; and Kalt, 1978) and crosssectional work (Solow, 1964; Griliches, 1967; and Dhyrmes and Zarembka, 1970; Paraskevopoulos, 1979) offered estimates in the range of 0.47 to 1.00. More recent data and work (Chung, 1987; Cronin, Colleran, and Gold, 1997; Rowthorn, 1999; and Boskin and Lau, 2000) suggest estimates ranging from 0.70 to 0.86. After reviewing this literature, we chose a value of 0.8 for σ 1 , which corresponds to α = -0.25.
Estimates for the annual rate of technical progress between the early 1970's and late 1980's tended to be about 0.3% (Barro, 1998 and Bernard and Jones, 1996) . Between the early 1980's and late 1990's, the estimates for the annual rate of technical progress increased to about 1.5% (Boskin and Lau, 2000; Bernanke and Gurkayak, 2001) . The former estimate is a rather low rate of technical progress, while the latter estimate is relatively high. After considering this range of estimates, we decided that a figure of 1% for the annual rate of technical progress was reasonable. This estimate corresponds to a parameter value of c = 1.01.
The parameter β is equal to 1 -1/σ 2 , where σ 2 is the within-period elasticity of substitution in consumption between any two of private goods, public goods, and leisure. We found few attempts in the literature to estimate the substitutability between goods and leisure. Auerbach et al. (1983) estimated the elasticity of substitution between private goods and leisure to be 0.8.
The one comparable study that we found (Ghez and Becker, 1975) estimated the elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure to be 0.83. On this basis, we decided that a value of 0.8 for σ 2 is reasonable.
The parameter γ is equal to 1 -1/σ 3 , where σ 3 is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption has been estimated more frequently, and the estimates provide a reasonable consensus among economists about the range of plausible values of this parameter. Auerbach et. al. (1983) Alogoskoufis (1987) shows that the within-period elasticity of substitution is always greater than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This implies that the value chosen for γ should be significantly below that chosen for β, as is the case here.
A sensitivity analysis (reported later) reveals little model sensitivity to variations in these parameter values. Thus the model conclusions are not likely to be affected significantly by the uncertainty concerning the values of these parameters.
The production function and the within-period utility function are calibrated from data for the U.S. economy for 2000. This calibration provides a ratio, λ, of marginal utility to price that must prevail for private goods and for leisure, for all future time periods. (If it did not prevail, then the assumption that a household maximizes its intertemporal utility would be incorrect). Private goods produced in 2000 and used for investment provide a numeraire. The level of the public good is not optimized, but rather is assumed to be whatever can be provided by the taxes that are currently levied.
The marginal products of land, labor, and capital specify pre-tax rent, wages, and interest respectively. The quantity of labor that is supplied in any future period is in equilibrium when the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the price of leisure (the wage after marginal taxes) is equal to λ. Consumption of private goods in any future period is in equilibrium when the ratio of the marginal utility of private goods in that period to the price of private goods in that period [(1 + consumption taxes), discounted to that period at the return to capital after marginal taxes] is equal to λ.
The intertemporal utility function is calibrated by estimating the unique value of the discount factor, δ, for which the saving rate appears to approach a horizontal asymptote after 40 years of simulation. This solution approach obviates the need to be concerned with the value of the final stocks of capital and land.
Any change in taxes produces a new equilibrium path, which is found by identifying a λ′ for which the saving rate approaches a horizontal asymptote when work and saving follow paths on which the ratio of marginal utility to price, for private goods and for leisure, in all periods after the reform occurs, takes the value λ′.
One way in which the calculations for the model differ from most previous models is that it is solved on a spreadsheet.
III. Calibration
The appendix shows the data for the U.S. economy that were used to calibrate the model. The model is closed by allocating the statistical discrepancy and net exports. The income of proprietors is allocated between labor and assets in proportion to the shares of labor and assets in all other income. Asset income is allocated between capital and land on the basis of the ratio of (the value of capital) to (the product of the value of land and the assumed efficiency with which land is used). Thus if land and capital have the same value and land is used with an efficiency of one-half, then we assume that two-thirds of asset income is a return to capital and one-third is a return to land.
Most
To compute the share, h, of social insurance payments that are taxes rather than payments for benefits, we aggregate Feldstein and Samwick's (1992) data into an overall average tax rate of 7.37% for Old Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI). Since the OASI tax rate at the time of their calculations was 10.7%, this implies that 68.9% of OASI payments are taxes. We assume that this ratio applies to all social insurance payments, so that h = 0.689. We take account of the proportion of earnings that exceed the Social Security maximum tax base to compute that, at the margin, 56.2% of social insurance payments are tax.
We allocate income taxes between taxes on labor and on assets on the basis of computed tax rates and the allocation of income between labor and assets. Property taxes are allocated between land and capital on the basis of the assumed shares of land and capital in income. If property tax assessments were perfectly accurate, then it would be more appropriate to allocate taxes in proportion to the value of land and capital. Our practice reflects a belief that land is systematically underassessed in proportion to its underuse.
Based on NIPA data, our model aggregates all federal, state, and local taxes into ten taxes, with bases, revenue, and rates in 2000 as shown in Table I .
The tax bases are derived from NIPA figures, and the revenue figures come directly from NIPA, except that we allocated the property tax as described and allocated the income tax between assets and labor based on IRS data from Statistics of Income. The difference between the income tax rates on assets and labor arises not directly from the tax code, but indirectly from the combination of progressivity in the income tax and the fact that people who receive asset returns have higher incomes on average than those who receive labor incomes.
The average tax rates are computed as tax revenue divided by the tax base. There are five taxes for which the marginal rate is different from the average rate: the individual income taxes on assets and on labor, which are progressive, the social insurance taxes on employers and employees, which are regressive because Social Security taxes have an upper limit, and excise taxes, which are shown as having a zero marginal tax rate because we treat excise taxes as We estimate the ratio of the average tax rate on labor to the average tax rate on assets, and the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate, on labor income and on asset income, from 1998 Statistics of Income. We estimate the proportion of income that is subject to Social Security taxes on the margin from data provided by the Social Security Administration.
To study the consequences of changing individual taxes, the taxes are computed sequentially, with some taxes being deducted from what would otherwise be the base of other taxes. Thus property taxes are levied first, and are deducted from the base of the profits tax. Both property taxes and profits taxes are deducted from the base of income taxes, and all factor taxes are deducted from the base of customs and other taxes. For labor income, the base is compensation of employees less employer contributions to social insurance; income taxes and both employer and employee contributions to social insurance are applied to this base. On the basis of this framework, we aggregate the tax rates into an overall tax on land income (t), an overall tax on labor income (l) an overall tax on capital income (k), and a consumption tax (p), using the following equations:
Because this is an inquiry into the consequences of broad-based taxes, we treat taxes as falling uniformly on their bases and ignore the fact that sales taxes are levied at different rates in different states, that some items are exempt from sales taxes, that profits taxes fall on equity financing and not on debt financing, and similar non-uniformities of taxes. An analysis that took these non-uniformities into account could be expected to generate greater estimates of excess burdens of taxes, since there would be more opportunities to substitute untaxed activities for taxed ones.
IV. Impacts of Small Tax Changes
We explore the consequences of five tax reductions, each of which could be financed by increasing in the percentage of income from land that is collected through the property tax by one percentage point, from 9.85% to 10.85%. The five tax reductions are shown in Table II .
We model the reduction in the income tax as a change by the same proportion in average and marginal tax rates on labor income and asset income. We model a change in the social insurance tax as a reduction of the same absolute amount in the average and marginal taxes, as would occur if the reduction were applied to the tax that finances Medicare.
The variations in the sizes of the reductions that can be made in different taxes arise from the combination of two factors. First, the smaller the initial tax base, the larger the reduction that is possible. Second, the larger the increase in the tax base that is induced by the tax change, the larger the reduction that is possible. The letters in the column "Impacts" indicate which of equations 5 -8 are affected by the tax reduction.
Each tax reduction has a magnitude that varies from year to year in such a way as to preserve "government output" (the sum of government spending on consumption goods and transfers plus the product of government capital), which is financed by what is left from government revenue after a fixed fraction of government revenue has been spent on investment in capital. We assume We report six measures of the impact of taxes on the economy:
• The percentage change in the wage after average taxes
• The percentage change in effort per worker
• The percentage change in the rate of return to saving after average taxes
• The percentage change in saving
• The percentage change in consumption
• The "annual net gain" per dollar of tax shift
We compute each year's net gain as the answer to the question "How much of this year's increase in saving would need to be converted to consumption of private goods to attain the same index of consumption (as a function of public goods, private goods, and leisure) as is attained this year under current taxes?" What is left of the increase in saving is that year's net gain.
The six measures of impact of the five small tax changes are shown in Figures 1-6 . The differences in the impacts of the tax changes can be traced to the fact that some tax changes have their direct effects on saving, some have their direct effects on working, and some have direct effects on both. In addition, when tax changes affect asset income, some affect both capital income and land income, and some affect only capital income. Finally, a reduction in the income tax has an additional impact because of the fact that the marginal harm that is caused by any tax is roughly proportional to its marginal rate. Because the income tax is progressive, its marginal rate is greater than its average rate, so that proportional reductions in average and marginal income tax rates reduce marginal rates by more than average rates, giving reductions in the income tax extra impact.
The impacts on real wages are shown in Figure 1 . The tax shift with the greatest initial impact on real wages is the shift from the social insurance tax to the land tax. However, the taxes with a significant impact on savings-the profit tax, the income tax and especially the improvement component of the property tax-have impacts that grow more rapidly over time, so that after about 15 years, the shift from the income tax is the shift with the greatest impact on wages. After 39 years, the shift from the improvement tax is the shift with the greatest impact on wages. This happens because lower taxes on saving increase the amount of saving, which increases the stock of capital, thereby increasing the marginal product of labor, which is reflected in wages. At all times, reductions in the sales tax and the profit tax are dominated by reductions in the social insurance tax, in impact on wages.
The impacts of small tax shifts on work effort are shown in Figure 2 . The shifts with the greatest impacts on work effort are from the income tax and the sales tax. There is no clear relationship between these effects and changes in well-being, because impacts on work effort combine income and substitution effects that work in opposite directions. A rise in the real wage has a substitution effect that leads to more work, but the improved economic efficiency from the tax shifts has income effects that lead to less work. These income effects are the reason that the impacts on work effort fall over time, and fall more rapidly when taxes on saving are reduced, leading to income that rises more rapidly over time. Impacts of the small tax shifts on the amount of saving are shown in Figure 4 . As with impacts on the return to saving, the impacts on the amount of saving are much greater on average than the impacts on work effort. Where the initial impacts on work effort ranged from 0.13% to 0.35%, the initial impacts on saving range from 0.83% to 3.79%. This is partly because the percentage changes in returns to savings are greater than the percentage changes in wages after taxes. But it is also partly because the income effect complements the substitution effect rather than working against it, as it is the case with work effort. A shift away from the improvement component of the property tax has by far the greatest impact on the amount of saving. Shifts away from the property tax and the profit tax have intermediate impacts. Shifts away from the sales tax and the social insurance tax have the smallest impacts. Figure 5 shows the impacts on consumption. Here "consumption" means the quantity computed in equation 3 that is a function of public goods, private goods, and leisure. It is an index of utility gained in a single period, and is the argument for a given year of the intertemporal utility function (equation 4). If one tax shift yields more consumption than another in all time periods, then it is better for consumers. If one tax shift yields more consumption in some periods and another yields more consumption in other periods, then the question of which is better is likely to depend on the discount rate. By this criterion, a tax shift away from the income tax is unambiguously better than a tax shift away from the profit tax, and a tax shift away from the sales tax is unambiguously better than a tax shift away from the social insurance tax. For the first 17 years that are modeled, a shift away from the sales tax provides the most consumption.
After 17 years, a shift away from the income tax provides more consumption. Beyond 34 years, a shift away from the tax on improvements provides the most consumption.
Net gain per dollar of tax shifted to land is shown in Figure 6 . As mentioned previously, net gain in each year is measured as that part of the increase in saving in the year that would not be needed to keep consumption constant. For all of the small tax shifts, the net gain per dollar of tax shift starts between $1.25 and $1.75. After 40 years they range from $1.20 to $2.35. For the first five years, a shift of taxes from the income tax has the greatest net benefit. After that, a shift from the tax on improvements has the greatest net benefit. The particular advantage of shifting the income tax is that this reduces the extra excess burden of the progressivity of the income tax.
The particular advantage of reducing the tax on improvements is that this has the greatest positive impact on saving, and greater saving produces a greater stock of capital, which raises wages.
V. Impacts of Large Tax Changes
In this section, we describe the economic effects of two large changes. The first of these is the replacement of the present progressive federal and state income taxes with a flat tax on all income at the rate required to preserve the path of public goods plus transfers that can be financed by existing taxes. The required rate of the flat income tax increases from 13.01% initially to 13.26% after 40 years. The second large tax change is an increase in the land tax to 90% of the rental value of land, combined with the elimination of the improvement component of the property tax, elimination of the tax on profits, elimination of the sales tax, elimination of import duties, and transformation of the income tax into a flat tax on all income at the rate required to preserve the path of public goods plus transfers. The required rate of this tax starts at 7.65%, increases to 7.72% after three years, and then falls continuously to 7.02% after 40 years.
The impacts of these large tax changes are not graphed with the others because the scale of their impacts dwarfs the other impacts. They are shown instead in Table III .
Our analysis says that the introduction of a flat income tax would increase the incentive to work by so much at the margin that it would initially lower the wage after tax by 3.21%. But with work effort increasing by 11.43%, workers' pay would rise initially by 7.85%. After 40 years of a flat income tax, wages would be 2.77% higher that with existing taxes and work effort would be 7.97% higher, producing workers' incomes that would be 10.96% higher. Because asset returns have higher average taxes than labor returns under the progressive tax system of the U.S., a flat income tax has a much bigger impact on saving than on work. In its first year, it raises the interest rate after average taxes by 20.71% (not 20.71 percentage points!). Saving in the first year rises by 68.29%. After 40 years, income and saving have increased by so much that the interest rate after tax falls by 9.42% compared to current taxes, but saving is still 29.30%
higher than under current taxes, because people are so much richer. The effect on consumption is a reduction of 1.61% in the first year (because saving is so highly stimulated) and an increase of 1.89% after 40 years. The net benefit as a percentage of NDP is 2.49% in the first year and 5.59% after 40 years. In real 2000 dollars this is $223 billion in the first year, rising to $1,009 billion in the 41 st year.
Our maximal land tax permits the elimination of the improvements portion of the property tax, the profits tax, the sales tax, and import duties, along with a reduction of the income tax to a 
VI. Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, we report the impacts on the analysis of employing alternative values for some of the data and parameters. To avoid a surfeit of information, Table IV Table IV reveals that the model is only slightly sensitive to variations in assumptions about elasticities of substitution and the rate of technological progress. Among these parameters, the greatest short-run sensitivity is to the elasticity of substitution in consumption, and the largest change is only 13%. The greatest long-run sensitivity is to the technological factor, where the effects after 40 years range from 20% to 31%.
The model is more sensitive to the value of land, the value of capital and the current efficiency with which land is used. Reducing the value of land by one third reduces the short-run net benefits of most tax shifts by about 20% and the long-run benefits by about 15%. Increasing the value of land by one third increases the short-run net benefits of most tax shifts by about 15%
and the long-run benefits by about 5% to 10%. There are two exceptions to these generalizations. The short-run net benefits of shift to a flat income tax are relatively insensitive to the value of land, but the long-run net benefits are noticeably greater when the value of land is lower. And the long-run benefits of the maximal land tax are relatively insensitive the value of land. -24, -28 -37, -47 -27, -38 -34, -49 -28, -41 -7, -20 -37, -33 All pessimistic assumptions -57, -63 -57, -65 -55, -64 -56, -69 -55, -66 -27, -40 -55, -58 Reducing the value of capital by 25% has an effect comparable to the effect of increasing the value of land by one third, and increasing the value of capital by 25% has about two thirds of the effect of reducing the value of land by one third. The flat tax is again an exception, where there is little effect in the short run, and in the long run the effect varies with the value of capital. And once again, the long-run benefits of the maximal land tax are relatively insensitive to the initial value of capital.
Reducing the initial land efficiency from 50% to 25% increases the short-run net benefits of tax changes by about 10% and the long-run benefits by about 30%. Increasing the initial land efficiency to 75% reduces most of the short-run and long-run net benefits of the modeled tax change by about 30%.
Based on the previous results, we designed a "worst case," in which all of the tested parameters were moved to the ends of their ranges that gave the lowest net benefits of shifting taxes to land. The elasticities of substitution in production and consumption were set to 0.65.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution was set to 0.25. The technological change parameter was set to 1.005. Land value was reduced by one third and capital was increased by 25%.
Finally, the initial land efficiency was set at 75%. With these parameters, the benefit of a flat income tax was reduced by 27% in the short run and by 40% in the long run. The benefits of shifting taxes to land were reduced by between 55% and 57% in the short run, and by 58% to 69% in the long run. For the maximal land tax, this still left a net gain of $591 billion in the first year (6.7% of NDP) and $2,037 billion in the 41 st year (14.2% of NDP).
V. Conclusion
Significant increases in the efficiency of the U.S. economy could be attained by flattening the income tax and by shifting taxes from labor and capital to land. In the short run, the greatest increase in after-tax wages is achieved by shifting taxes from wages to land. In the long run, the greatest increase in wages is achieved by shifting taxes from capital to land. We estimate that Uncertainty about the value of land and current land efficiency creates significant uncertainty about the magnitude of the efficiency gains that might be achieved. 
